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Abstract 
International organizations’ ability to respond promptly to crises is essential for their 
effectiveness and legitimacy. For the UN, which sends peacekeeping missions to some of the 
world’s most difficult conflicts, responsiveness can save lives and protect peace. Very often, 
however, the UN fails to deploy peacekeepers rapidly. Lacking a standing army, the UN relies 
on its member states to provide troops for peacekeeping operations. In the first systematic study 
of the determinants of deployment speed in UN peacekeeping, we theorize that this speed 
hinges on the incentives, capabilities, and constraints of the troop-contributing countries. Using 
duration modeling, we analyze novel data on the deployment speed in 28 peacekeeping 
operations between 1991 and 2015. Our data reveal three principal findings: All else equal, 
countries which depend on peacekeeping reimbursements by the UN, are exposed to negative 
externalities from a particular conflict, or lack parliamentary constraints on sending troops 
abroad deploy more swiftly than others. By underlining how member state characteristics affect 
aggregate outcomes, these findings have important implications for research on the 
effectiveness of UN peacekeeping, troop contribution dynamics, and rapid deployment 
initiatives.  
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 2 
The speed with which the UN deploys peacekeepers is critical for the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of its field operations. Once the Security Council establishes a peacekeeping 
operation, every day that passes before troops are fully deployed weighs on the prospects of 
success. In cases like Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and Chad, delayed arrival of UN peacekeepers 
undermined, and sometimes derailed, the peace process. The UN’s credibility and authority 
suffered, both locally and globally. In other instances, the UN managed to put a meaningful 
military presence on the ground within days, increasing its ability to shape the tactical and 
political environment. How can we account for this variation in the UN’s response time? In 
particular, since any UN peacekeeping force is a composite of troop contributions by member 
states, why do some countries deploy their troops faster than others?  
 
Extant literature does not provide satisfying answers. While the importance of timely 
peacekeeping deployment is undisputed, its determinants remain poorly understood. To fill this 
gap, we engage in the first systematic, large-n analysis of the factors that affect deployment 
speed in UN peacekeeping. We develop a theoretical argument that accounts for variation 
across troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and test its observable implications against new 
data on the deployment speed of TCCs across 28 UN peacekeeping operations established 
between 1991 and 2015.  
 
Theoretically, we focus on explanations at the contributor-level. While a range of factors 
affects UN deployment speed, including geopolitics, mission country conditions, and the UN’s 
overall force pool, rapid deployment ultimately depends on how fast member states are willing 
and able to deploy the troops that make up a mission. We therefore contend that a better 
understanding of the UN’s capacity for rapid deployment hinges on shifting the focus from 
peacekeeping missions in the aggregate to their constituent components: individual TCCs. We 
theorize that the relative speed of TCC deployments depends on the incentives, capabilities, 
and constraints of each TCC, conditional on other factors that affect all missions and all TCCs 
at a given time.    
Empirically, we use a survival framework to model the time from mission establishment to 
observed deployment. Our data reveal three principal findings, all pointing to the importance 
of contributor-level explanations. We demonstrate, first, that countries that are more sensitive 
to the financial incentives that the UN offers deploy more rapidly than comparable countries. 
Second, countries that are exposed to conflict externalities, specifically refugee flows, deploy 
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with greater urgency than comparable countries that are less exposed. Third, countries where 
foreign deployments require parliamentary approval deploy slower than others. The solidity of 
these findings varies across different cuts of the data. Beyond TCC-level factors, we find that 
deployment speed is sensitive to mission country characteristics, including its logistical 
conditions, the degree of violence, and colonial links to the permanent members of the UN 
Security Council (the P5).  
Our study has implications for both research and policy, further elaborated in the conclusion. 
First, it enhances our understanding of rapid deployment in UN peacekeeping. The nascent 
literature on institutional arrangements to facilitate rapid deployment (Langille, 2014; Koops 
& Novoseloff, 2017; Karlsrud & Reykers, 2019) has not analyzed alternative explanations in 
a multivariate framework, and no study of rapid deployment has given sufficient consideration 
to contributor-level explanations. When a peacekeeping operation fails to deploy quickly, the 
UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is often blamed. In reality, the UN can only be as fast as its 
troop contributors, which differ significantly in their deployment speed. Mission composition 
is thus a key factor in UN rapid deployment. 
Second, our study nuances available knowledge on states’ motivations for participating in UN 
peacekeeping. We show how some motivations discussed in the literature on troop 
contributions (e.g., Gaibulloev, Sandler, & Shimizu, 2009; Victor, 2010; Coleman & Nyblade, 
2018) also affect how quickly contributions are delivered. At the same time, our study 
demonstrates that factors that shape the willingness to contribute troops are not identical to 
those determining how fast those troops are deployed. Even states that are highly motivated to 
participate and to deploy quickly may be slowed down by weak capabilities or parliamentary 
hurdles.  
Third, as the first systematic study of UN peacekeeping deployment speed, the article provides 
a platform for further research which could, for example, clarify scope conditions, generate 
qualitative evidence on how exactly incentives impact deployment speed, and systematically 
assess the assumed link between deployment speed and mission performance.  
Finally, our findings have important policy implications. We recommend that the UN focuses 
its efforts to improve deployment speed on those TCCs that it can realistically influence. Since 
financial considerations seem to motivate rapid deployment, the UN should further explore 
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possibilities for calibrating the existing system of incentives in order to increase its deployment 
speed.  
 
Rapid deployment: Crucial for effectiveness and legitimacy, but poorly understood  
While the ultimate success of a UN peacekeeping operation depends on many factors, including 
its mandate, resources, and local dynamics (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008; Howard, 
2008), the speed with which it deploys is a decisive element. Rapidly deployed forces allow 
the UN to ‘shape the tactical environment on the ground at the most important, most fluid 
moment – that when peace deals have just been struck, or missions just authorized’ (Jones et 
al., 2009: 24). The 2015 UN High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations identified 
slow deployment as a major problem: ‘When a mission trickles into a highly demanding 
environment, it is dangerously exposed on the ground and initial high expectations turn to 
disappointment, frustration and anger’ (UN, 2015: 63).  
Beyond the success of individual missions, rapid deployment matters for UN legitimacy. 
Indifference to a crisis can be blamed on the Security Council, and a resumption of violence 
may reflect a myriad of factors over which the UN has little control. By contrast, deployment 
delays after the Security Council mandates a mission expose the UN as unable to deliver on its 
own objectives. Yet it is not purely the fault of the UN Secretariat: as long as they lack standing 
military capacities, international organizations engaged in peacekeeping, including the UN, are 
critically dependent on member states contributing troops.  
Given its importance, the issue of rapid deployment has attracted surprisingly little academic 
attention. Beyond the nascent literature on institutional mechanisms cited above, Hardt’s 
(2014) study of how promptly regional organizations (but not the UN) react to crises looks at 
the speed of diplomatic decision-making on mission authorization and the promptness of 
mission start-up. The speed of deployment beyond the start-up phase has not been studied. The 
literature on states’ motivations for contributing troops to UN operations tells us little about 
why countries that are willing to contribute vary in the speed at which they deploy. Historical 
data show that the largest contributors, which evidently have both the interest and ability to 
provide troops, differ considerably in deployment speed. The factors that determine troop 
contributions diverge, at least in part, from the factors that determine how fast countries deploy 
their troops.  
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TCCs’ incentives, capabilities, and constraints 
When the Security Council considers a new peacekeeping operation, the UN Department of 
Peace Operations (DPO)1 initiates discussions with potential TCCs to gauge their willingness 
to contribute troops. Once the relevant national authorities in the TCC approve the decision to 
contribute, the UN and the member state typically sign a Memorandum of Understanding 
outlining the administrative, logistical, and financial conditions of the deployment. The TCC 
is then expected to assemble, prepare, and equip its contingent. The final step is the transport 
to the theatre of operations, which can be organized by the TCC or the UN.  
TCCs vary in the speed with which they complete this process. To explain this variation, we 
develop an argument centered on three broad factors: incentives, capabilities, and constraints. 
Incentives refer to the motivations that TCCs have to pledge and deploy their troops quickly. 
Capabilities are military, logistical, and institutional resources of TCCs which may impact pre-
deployment preparations and actual deployment speed. Constraints capture procedural barriers 
that must be overcome before a TCC can deploy. Within these categories, our analysis focuses 
on economic and security incentives, military deployment capabilities, and parliamentary 
constraints. We do not assert that these are the only factors determining deployment speed, but 
we highlight them as both important in their own right and indicative of the impact of TCC-
level factors in their respective categories. Mission conditions, such as the intensity of the 
conflict and mission country’s geography, affect all troops deploying to the same mission, and 
we adjust for them in our analysis.  
 
Incentives 
States weigh political, economic, security, institutional, and normative factors when deciding 
to contribute troops to UN peace operations (Bellamy & Williams, 2013). Some motivations 
arise from the relationship of the potential TCC with the mission country (Perkins & 
Neumayer, 2008; Gaibulloev, Sandler, & Shimizu, 2009; Uzonyi, 2015) or other states 
contributing to the mission (Ward & Dorussen, 2016; Henke, 2016; Passmore, Shannon, & 
 
1 Before 2019, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO.  
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Hart, 2018). Some of these motivations apply not only to the decision to contribute troops but 
also the speed with which those troops are deployed. Recognizing that states have different 
types of motivations, we focus our investigation on economic incentives, varying with states’ 
susceptibility to UN reimbursements, and security incentives, varying with their exposure to 
conflict-generated negative externalities.  
Economic incentives arise from the reimbursements that the UN provides to TCCs for their 
participation. Since reimbursement rates are equal across all TCCs – currently $1,428 per 
soldier per month – regardless of their economic situation or military expenditure, they are 
more attractive to some states than others. UN reimbursements are profitable only under 
restrictive conditions (Coleman & Nyblade, 2018) but frequently highlighted as a key 
consideration for low- and middle-income TCCs (Bobrow & Boyer, 1997; Khanna, Sandler, 
& Shimizu, 1998; Bove & Elia, 2011; Gaibulloev, Sandler, & Shimizu, 2009). Qualitative 
evidence suggests that reimbursements matter for some states: a former Fijian Army Chief of 
Staff acknowledged that sending peacekeepers abroad has become ‘[t]he whole purpose of the 
Fiji military’ (Reuters, 2014), while Lundgren (2018) cites similar motivations expressed by 
Indonesia, Malawi, Senegal, Bangladesh, and Ghana. Even TCCs that do not directly profit 
from UN reimbursements may appreciate them as a way of funding deployment bonuses for 
their troops or of securing other benefits of peacekeeping participation (e.g. diplomatic 
visibility or military training) at little or no cost.  
If states vary in the extent to which they value UN reimbursements, we would expect 
reimbursements to shape not only peacekeeping participation but also deployment speed. States 
whose governments or militaries view UN peacekeeping as attractive in part for economic 
reasons know that the sooner troops are deployed, the sooner UN monies will begin trickling 
in.2 In the longer term, moreover, TCCs susceptible to the pull provided by UN reimbursements 
should be interested in creating an image of a reliable, responsive partner in order to secure 
future invitations to contribute.  
Deployment decisions may also be affected by externalities emerging from the conflict. Uzonyi 
(2015) argues that the decision to contribute peacekeeping troops is predicted by dyadic 
refugee flows. Refugee flows have been linked to the spread of civil war (Salehyan & Gleditsch 
2006), so TCCs want to stem refugee inflows as quickly as possible, including by speedily 
 
2 The UN only begins reimbursing TCCs after their troops have been deployed.  
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deploying their contingents to a peacekeeping operation that could stabilize the refugee-
sending state. 
These logics lead to our first hypothesis:  
H1: The higher a TCC’s economic and security incentives, the faster it will deploy. 
 
Capabilities 
Deploying troops to a peacekeeping mission presents a number of organizational and logistical 
challenges. Contingents must be prepared for deployment. Equipment and materiel must be 
procured and readied according to UN guidelines. Troops must be transported to the theatre of 
operations. TCCs with advanced military capabilities are more likely to overcome these 
challenges quickly: they maintain higher levels of readiness, conduct swifter pre-deployment 
preparations, and are more able to provide transportation using national strategic air- or sealift. 
For example, the 2006 reinforcements of the UN mission in Lebanon deployed swiftly in part 
because European TCCs ‘made use of their own means for putting boots on the ground rather 
than relying on UN logistics’ (Mattelaer, 2009: 13).  
Conversely, TCCs with less advanced military capabilities typically have lower readiness 
levels, are more dependent on the UN or other states for transportation, and may need to wait 
until a third party provides the necessary equipment or self-sustainment services (Coleman & 
Williams, 2017). Another capability is institutional memory, or the TCC’s familiarity with UN 
procedures, systems, and standards. Deployment is likely to be easier (and possibly quicker) if 
all counterparts are experienced at working together. We expect both military resources and 
peacekeeping experience to impact deployment speed: 
H2: The greater TCC’s military resources and UN peacekeeping experience, the faster it will 
deploy. 
 
Constraints  
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States have different internal approval processes for international troop deployments. Some 
governments face few restrictions on their ability to commit peacekeeping troops, while others 
require formal consent from other domestic actors. One prominent example is the need to seek 
parliamentary approval, which can considerably lengthen the deployment process. For 
example, in the UN Mission in Liberia, ‘[o]ne of the reasons for delays in deployment was that 
a number of countries that had offered troops subsequently had to obtain legislative or 
executive approvals before confirming their offers’ (UN, 2004: 6). The parliamentary approval 
process can involve several stages: when the Netherlands considered contributing to the UN 
mission in Mali, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Force Commander, 
and the head of DPKO’s Africa Division had to testify before the Dutch parliament before it 
gave its go-ahead (Karlsrud & Smith, 2015). Observers are aware that ‘lengthy parliamentary 
approval processes in developed countries […] can lead to long delays in deployment’ (Smith 
& Boutellis, 2013: 6), but we note that a TCC at any level of development can have 
parliamentary controls. However, in weakly democratized countries (or ‘hybrid’ regimes), 
formal parliamentary controls may have less of a delaying effect than in consolidated 
democracies.  
This leads to our third hypothesis: 
H3: The greater the TCC’s effective parliamentary controls over foreign deployments, the 
slower it will deploy. 
 
Interdependencies 
Our theoretical framework focuses on the incentives, capabilities, and constraints of individual 
TCCs. Yet since peacekeeping operations are multinational, the deployment speed of one TCC 
may be affected by that of other states. Interdependence may emerge for strategic reasons: a 
TCC may deliberately accelerate or delay its troop deployment in response to the observed 
deployments of other TCCs. For example, a state that is primarily motivated to deploy for 
other-regarding reasons, such as promoting peace or human rights, but which is sensitive to the 
costs and risks of deployment, might be inclined to free-ride and delay deployment if other 
TCCs are already on the ground. By contrast, TCCs motivated primarily by self-regarding 
reasons that cannot be satisfied via free-riding, such as financial gain, would be less likely to 
delay deployment (cf. Passmore, Shannon, & Hart, 2018). Interdependence can also emerge 
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from network effects: TCCs are more willing to contribute troops if countries with similar 
foreign policy preferences also contribute (Ward & Dorussen, 2016), and they may also be 
more motivated to do so quickly.  
Thus, interdependencies are most likely to be substantial if TCCs have good information about 
other TCCs, seek the promotion of public goods, and prefer to deploy alongside likeminded 
countries. They would be lowest if TCCs lack information about other TCCs’ deployment 
speed, seek private gains, and are indifferent to other TCCs’ preferences. To assess our 
privileged mechanisms while controlling for interdependencies, we adopt several strategies. 
We examine the role of the lead TCC, the largest contributor to each mission, based on the 
assumption that its deployments are the most visible to other TCCs, while it is unlikely that 
mission participants would have information on the progress of pre-deployment preparations 
in all other TCCs. We also investigate the role of private and public goods in motivating 
individual TCCs, their preference network centrality, and the overall number of countries 
participating in a mission.  
 
Data  
We evaluate our hypotheses against data on 28 UN missions deployed between 1991 and 2015 
(Table A1). These data cover all substantial peacekeeping operations fielded by the UN during 
this period.3 To measure deployment speed, we combine data on authorized troop levels, 
sourced from Security Council resolutions, with UN troop deployment data from the IPI 
Peacekeeping Database (Perry & Smith, 2013). The UN reports the number of troops by each 
mission, TCC, and month, leading us to employ the month as our temporal unit of analysis.    
To allow for an analysis of the speed of deployment, we reformat these data in two ways. First, 
for each country and mission, we calculate the number of troops that have arrived anew in the 
mission each month, defined as the difference between the deployment in the observed month 
and the previous month. Our unit of observation for this analysis is the troop unit, a group of 
100 troops from the same TCC and mission. This unit of observation balances granularity of 
measurement with substantive relevance. Selecting an individual soldier as the unit of 
observation would provide the highest granularity but would not correspond to a substantively 
 
3 We exclude missions with fewer than 1,000 troops.  
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meaningful deployment. Selecting the entire mission as the unit of analysis would place all 
emphasis on substance, sacrificing granularity of measurement. Our unit of observation 
provides reasonable granularity while still reflecting meaningful deployments, roughly 
corresponding to company-size military units. The 100-troops threshold also excludes small, 
‘token’ contributions (Coleman, 2013), which could otherwise bias our results. We present 
results based on alternate units of observation (individual peacekeepers or TCC contingents) 
in the online appendix. 
Second, given our interest in measuring the time to deployment, we restructure the data as 
event history data (Cox & Oakes, 1984; Freedman, 2008). Troop units enter the risk set upon 
mission establishment and exit at the time of deployment. Based on monthly observations, we 
code the event history of troop units as 0 until they deploy, 1 in the month they deploy, and 
missing thereafter. The time troop units ‘survive’ in the non-deployed state corresponds to their 
deployment time. For example, when the Security Council established the UN Mission in 
Sudan (UNMIS) in 2005, it authorized 9,250 troops, corresponding to 9,250 / 100 = 92 troop 
units entering our data in the non-deployed state. For each of these troop units, we then record 
the date of deployment, allowing us to calculate its deployment time. For example, Egypt’s 
UNMIS deployment reached 9 troops after three months, 98 after five months, and 173 in the 
sixth month. According to our criteria, Egypt’s deployment corresponds to zero troop units 
until the sixth month, when it is coded as having one 100-sized troop unit deployed and 73 
troops counting towards the second troop unit. In the seventh month, Egypt deployed an 
additional 459 troops (or 532 including the 73 from before), which we code as 5 troop units 
deployed in that month. 
We impose four restrictions on our data. First, we exclude resolutions that modify troop 
ceilings of ongoing missions. Given that we cannot confidently attribute deployments to 
specific mission phases after such size revisions,4 we cannot evaluate TCC-level explanations 
on data beyond initial mandates. A focus on initial mandates, as opposed to strength increases, 
also provides the best measure of the UN’s ability to respond to new crises. Second, we exclude 
troops that join a mission via ‘re-hatting’ from a preceding mission. Already in the country, re-
hatted troops ‘deploy’ via an administrative decision rather than procedures sensitive to the 
mechanisms theorized here. Third, we restrict our analysis to actually deployed troops, 
 
4 If troops deploy after a mandate revision, and the previous mandate has not yet been ‘filled’, we cannot determine 
whether the new troops were pledged before or after the revision. 
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implying that no units are right-censored in the basic models. Given that information on troop 
pledges is confidential, we cannot identify troops that were pledged but never deployed. Fourth, 
to diminish the influence of extreme observations, we exclude the small number of troop units 
that deploy more than 36 months after mission establishment.     
Figure 1 presents the total event count (deployed troop units) by months since authorization, 
across the missions in our sample. The distribution demonstrates that the UN is able to field a 
considerable number of troops within the first 3 months, and a majority within a year, but that 
a sizeable minority remain non-deployed for longer periods.  
 
 
Figure 1: Count of deployed 100-person troop units by months since mission authorization; 
28 peacekeeping missions, 1991-2015. 
 
Figure 2 exhibits the median deployment time by mission. It varies from over a year (UN 
Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUC) to one month (UN 
Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM). Some of this variance is due to mission composition, 
emerging from the TCC-level variation in the deployment speed. Some of it reflects non-TCC 
factors, including the UN’s varying ability to respond and different circumstances facing each 
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mission. To isolate the TCC-level effects, we therefore need to adjust for mission-specific and 
international conditions in our multivariate analysis.  
 
Figure 2: Median deployment time in months by mission. 
 
Covariates  
We view the deployment process as a general function Sijt = f(Xij, Zj, Vt), where Sijt is the 
deployment time of troop unit i, deploying to mission j in year t. Heterogeneity across TCCs, 
missions, and international conditions is represented via Xij, Zj, and Vt,, respectively. The model 
includes one vector of covariates varying across both TCCs and missions (Xij), one vector that 
varies across missions but not over time (Zj), and one varying over time but not across missions 
(Vt). The variables of key theoretical interest are found in the first vector; control variables in 
all three.  
To represent attributes that vary across TCCs (Xij), we include operationalizations of our 
privileged explanatory variables. We gauge a TCC’s sensitivity to economic incentives via the 
variable expenditure per soldier (cf. Gaibulloev, Sandler, & Shimizu, 2009) calculated from 
Correlates of War data (Singer, Bremer & Stuckey, 1972). Countries that spend less per soldier 
would be more likely to view UN reimbursements as attractive. Recognizing that economic 
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incentives are difficult to measure and that military expenditure per soldier may correlate with 
capacity, we employ a series of alternative measures in additional tests. Net beneficiary is 
coded as 1 for states where the military expenditure per soldier exceeds the standard yearly UN 
reimbursements for one soldier. Peacekeeping dependency is operationalized as the value of 
UN reimbursements in relation to the military budget. GDP per capita measures the mean level 
of prosperity in a TCC.  
To capture security incentives emerging from externalities, we include the variable Dyadic 
refugees, coded as 1 if there are any refugees from the mission country in the observed TCC.5 
Given that many TCCs are not exposed to any refugee flows, a binary threshold indicator is 
reasonable, but we also test the variable Dyadic refugees (proportion), operationalized as the 
proportion of all refugees in the observed TCC originating from the mission country.  
To evaluate the effect of capabilities (H2), we include two measures of military readiness and 
peacekeeping experience. Military capability is operationalized as the TCC defense budget in 
the year of observation (Singer, Bremer & Stuckey, 1972). We operationalize a TCC’s 
familiarity with UN peacekeeping based on its Mission experience, calculated as the 
cumulative mission years in which a TCC contributed more than 100 troops in the preceding 
five years. TCCs that have made long-standing and substantial contributions score high on this 
variable, whereas TCCs with smaller or short-lived contributions score lower.  
To measure the impact of constraints, we include Parliamentary controls (H3), coded 1 for 
countries requiring the approval of the national legislature to declare war or engage in 
international military interventions and 0 otherwise (V-Dem data). To assess how 
parliamentary controls vary across regimes, we interact it with Democracy, coded as 1 for 
countries with a Polity score above 5 in the year of observation and 0 otherwise (Marshall, 
Robert, & Jaggers, 2016).   
We include a vector of controls to account for additional TCC-level considerations, mission 
conditions, and temporal variation in UN-wide factors. Distance from a TCC capital to the 
mission country capital is calculated using the haversine formula and coordinates provided in 
Perry & Smith (2013). Shorter distance could motivate TCCs to respond swiftly and alleviates 
logistical challenges, although airlift may counteract the effect. Contingent size is the sum of 
 
5 Calculated based on UNHCR data (available via http://data.unhcr.org/dataviz). 
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troop units deploying from the same TCC to the same mission. Larger contingents may be 
difficult to assemble and transport, but they are more likely to be self-sustaining and enjoy 
other benefits of scale. Dyadic trade is operationalized as the TCC-mission country trade as a 
proportion of all trade of the observed TCC in year t, calculated from information in Barbieri 
& Keshk (2016). A baseline expectation is that dyadic trade promotes faster deployment, but 
we recognize that many conflict countries (and TCCs) have low volumes of international trade. 
We adjust for mission conditions (Zj) relating to logistics, conflict intensity, and political 
salience. To account for variation in how easily arriving troops can deploy to bases across the 
mission country, we adjust for the square kilometer Area of the mission country and its Level 
of development, operationalized as its GDP per capita. Countries that are large and 
underdeveloped, such as Mali, pose greater logistical difficulties than countries that are small 
and more economically developed, such as Lebanon. Recognizing that severe conflicts 
accompanied by deaths and displacement are likely to be treated as a priority by the 
international community, we include a measure of Battle deaths (Gleditsch et al., 2002). 
Economic importance is operationalized as the total value of the mission country’s imports and 
exports in the year prior to the mission’s establishment (Barbieri & Keshk, 2016). 
Humanitarian salience is measured as the count of worldwide refugees from the mission 
country, based on UNHCR data.6 Finally, we include the variable P5 colony to capture former 
colonial ties between the mission country and any permanent member of the Security Council.  
Models aiming to gauge interdependencies include three additional measures. First, we test the 
effect of Lead TCC, coded as 1 for the TCC set to become the largest (and most visible) 
contributor to a mission, and 0 otherwise. Lead TCCs are known to be particularly committed 
to the success of the operation, for which they often supply the head of mission and the force 
commander (Oksamytna, Bove, & Lundgren, 2020), which may affect the speed of their own 
deployment. Second, we include the Number of TCCs that contribute to a mission, based on 
the expectation that a higher number of contributors may induce free-riding with regard to 
speedy deployment (Gaibulloev, Sandler, & Shimizu, 2009; Passmore, Shannon, & Hart, 
2018). Third, following Ward & Dorussen (2016), who argue that TCCs prefer to deploy 
alongside TCCs with similar foreign policy preferences, we use their measure of Preference 
 
6 Note that these two variables represent the global interest whereas the dyadic measures of trade and refugees 
represent the interests of specific TCCs. 
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centrality based on complementarities of votes in the UN General Assembly, and like them, 
we also include the squared term of the variable.  
Heterogeneity in the international conditions (Vt) enter the model via one covariate, the variable 
Overstretch, coded as 1 for years in which the UN force pool experienced significant depletion 
(more than 10,000 new troops deployed in the previous year) and 0 otherwise. Our assumption 
is that deployment is slower in years when the UN is overstretched.  
 
Results 
We evaluate our hypotheses through Cox proportional hazard models. A method for 
investigating the effect of covariates on the time an event takes to happen, a Cox model is a 
function of an unspecified baseline hazard, modified by a vector of parameters, which describe 
how the hazard rate changes in response to covariates (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; 
Freedman, 2008). In our case, the hazard rate corresponds to the probability that a troop unit 
will deploy at a given time, measured in months since the mission’s establishment, given that 
it has not yet done so. Since troop units are nested within missions, they are likely to exhibit 
correlated outcomes. To account for these dependencies, we employ a marginal model 
approach with robust errors clustered on missions (Therneau & Grambsch, 2013).7  
Table I exhibits the results. Model 1 is estimated on all the data. Since Cox proportional hazards 
model can be sensitive to outliers, we consider the more conservative Model 2, which excludes 
influential observations (having deviance residuals with an absolute value greater than 2.5), the 
main model. In Models 3 and 4 we examine interactions. Models 5 through 8 in Table II report 
our tests of interdependencies and historical shifts in UN peacekeeping. Tables A5-A11 in the 
online appendix contain robustness checks. We report logged hazard ratios. Increases in 
variables with coefficients above 0 correspond to faster deployment; increases in variables with 
coefficients below 0 correspond to slower deployment. All continuous variables are log-
transformed. We use the Efron method for ties and report alternative methods in the online 
appendix. 
 
7 In our robustness tests, we also report estimations with clustering at the TCC level (Table A5).  
 16 
Table I: Cox duration models of time to deployment  
 
 (1) 
All data 
(2) 
Without influential 
observations 
(3) 
Parliamentary 
interaction  
(4) 
Time 
interactions 
Expenditure / soldier  -0.16† -0.17* -0.17* -0.21† 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) 
Dyadic refugees 0.51* 0.50* 0.49* 1.14* 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.47) 
Military capability 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.19** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
Mission experience  -0.12 -0.13† -0.13† -0.15 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) 
Parliamentary controls -0.20† -0.32** -0.18 -0.58* 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.16) (0.24) 
Distance 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.09 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) 
Dyadic trade -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 
 (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.37) 
Contingent size 0.35** 0.34** 0.36** 0.50** 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.16) 
Area -0.25** -0.28** -0.24** -0.34** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) 
GDP/capita mission country -0.10 -0.07 -0.10 -0.16 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) 
Battle deaths -0.11 -0.13 -0.11 -0.16 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.24) 
P5 colony 0.42 0.49† 0.42 0.54 
 (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.38) 
Economic importance -0.45* -0.52** -0.44* -0.56* 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.23) 
Humanitarian salience 0.19 0.22† 0.19 0.21 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) 
Democracy   0.16  
   (0.12)  
Parliamentary controls  democracy   -0.06  
   (0.22)  
Expenditure / soldier  log. time    -0.01 
    (0.02) 
Dyadic refugees  log. time    -0.35† 
    (0.20) 
Military capability  log. time    -0.11** 
    (0.04) 
Parliamentary controls  log. time    0.20 
    (0.12) 
Observations 1,968 1,942 1,968 12,251 
R2 0.26 0.31 0.27 0.10 
Log Likelihood -12,663 -12,413 -12,660 -17,065 
Estimates are logarithms of hazard ratios. Increases in coefficients with positive coefficients are 
associated with faster deployment. Robust errors clustered on missions. Efron method for ties. Model 4 
with log-time interactions. All continuous variables logged. †p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
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Several of the results are consistent with our theoretical expectations. Supporting H1, 
expenditure per soldier is negatively associated with deployment speed in all models. This 
indicates that TCCs with stronger economic incentives deploy faster than comparable TCCs 
with weaker incentives. The magnitude of the effect is considerable. Using Gandrud’s (2015) 
simulation procedures, we calculate relative deployment hazards and plot them as percentage 
changes.8 As illustrated in Figure 3, all else equal, decreasing expenditure per soldier by one 
standard deviation yields a 20% increase in the expected probability of deployment at any given 
time.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Relative hazards of military expenditure per soldier on deployment time. Shaded 
areas represent 50/95% confidence intervals.  
We recognize the possibility of a capacity effect: rising expenditure per soldier can translate 
into better training and readiness. If so, the coefficient on expenditure per soldier would 
represent the net effect of capacity and incentives, each pulling in opposite directions, with the 
incentives effect dominating. The negative coefficient remains when we exclude military 
capacity, which reinforces the incentives interpretation (Table A6). An alternative model, 
 
8 Simulation calculations are based on Model 2 and, for the time interactions discussed below, on Model 4. For 
the purpose of presentation of simulation results, variables are standardized with a mean of 0. 
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which includes overall military capacity, military personnel, and their interaction, shows that 
military capacity is positive but insignificant, military personnel positive and significant, while 
the interaction between them is negative (Table A6). This suggests that overall military 
capacity provides little benefit, while reinforcing the finding that TCCs with underfinanced, 
large armies deploy faster. This may be because they enjoy the simultaneous benefits of scale 
(they can deploy large forces) and economic incentives (they spend little per troop, making UN 
reimbursements attractive). 
Tests with alternative measures, reported in Table A7 of the online appendix, support the 
incentives interpretation. While the estimates exhibit high variance, our measures of net 
beneficiary, peacekeeping dependency, and lower prosperity all correlate with faster 
deployment. Qualitative evidence on TCCs from our sample supports the link between 
economic incentives and shorter deployment speed,9 but limited availability of similar 
qualitative data precludes a systematic test. Overall, while the overall evidence favors the  
conclusion that economic incentives speed up deployments, the varying coefficients motivate 
a cautious interpretation. In the conclusion, we return to this question, outlining strategies for 
data collection and research that may elucidate how economic incentives operate and establish 
more precise scope conditions.  
Consistent with the other component of H1, refugees from the mission country predict faster 
deployments. The coefficient is positive and consistently significant at the 95% level or higher. 
The presence of refugees from the mission country increases deployment hazards by 65%. 
Importantly, as indicated in Model 3 in Table A6, the effect is insensitive to the size of refugee 
flows, suggesting that perceptions of externalities matter more than actual numbers. For several 
missions in our sample, there are clear links between refugee inflows and peacekeeping 
deployments: for example, Sweden, Turkey, France, and the UK were both major TCCs in the 
UN mission in former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and hosted thousands – sometimes tens of 
thousands – fleeing Bosnians. Swedish parliament’s debates and decisions that authorized 
 
9 For example, economic incentives vary between Pakistan and South Africa, two countries of comparable military 
capacity ($3.6 billion versus $3.3 billion defense budgets) and parliamentary controls (none). Pakistan’s 
expenditure per soldier is 5,900 dollars annually, about one tenth of South Africa’s (53,500 dollar) and below the 
annual UN reimbursement (17,136 dollars). The profiles of both countries as UN troop contributions mention 
economic incentives in Pakistan’s case but not in South Africa’s case (Malik, 2014; Lotze & de Coning, 2015), a 
possible reason why Pakistan deploys its peacekeepers about twice as fast as South Africa. 
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participation in UNPROFOR explicitly linked refugee inflows with the urgency of reacting 
speedily to the Yugoslav crisis.10  
We recognize that the effect of dyadic refugee flows may reflect alternative mechanisms. It is 
possible, first, that countries that are open to receiving refugees are also more likely to respond 
willingly to the UN’s requests for troops and deploy those troops speedily. Second, diaspora 
groups, pressuring TCC governments to respond more swiftly to a crisis in their home country, 
may account for some of the effect. 
Contrary to theoretical expectations (H2), we do not find that troop units from TCCs with 
higher military capabilities deploy more swiftly. The estimated coefficient is positive but 
insignificant. However, when a time interaction is included, as we do in Model 4, the effect is 
statistically significant but subject to temporal attenuation over the mission’s lifespan. As time 
from mission authorization elapses, the variable’s effect diminishes, suggesting that a greater 
military capability provides a real deployment benefit only during the initial months. This 
finding is consistent with the view that independent military capabilities, such as airlift and 
self-sustainment capacity, matter most in the startup phase and less when the mission is more 
established.  
The coefficient on Mission experience is generally statistically insignificant, suggesting that 
long-time TCCs do not systematically differ from other TCCs in deployment speed. The 
measure might be biased against TCCs in the earliest missions in our sample. By construction, 
these TCCs would have little mission experience, given that there are no earlier missions. 
However, the coefficient does not change even if such missions are excluded, so the conclusion 
from our data must be that mission experience does not lend speed advantages, when other 
covariates are taken into consideration.  
Regarding parliamentary controls (H3), the results are largely consistent with theory, but differ 
in precision across subsets of the data. It is most precisely estimated in the main Model 2, 
which excludes influential observations. The negative coefficient suggests that TCCs with 
more restrictive procedures for foreign military engagements deploy more slowly than 
comparable TCCs with greater executive discretion. Figure 4 illustrates the difference as 
relative hazards. All else equal, parliamentary checks reduce the hazard rate by about 26%, 
 
10 Proposition 1995/96:113 and parliamentary debate 15 December 1995 (96:39).  
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corresponding to an increase of the median deployment time from 4 to 6 months. Including an 
interaction between parliamentary controls and regime type (Model 3) indicates that procedural 
barriers are higher in democratic countries. While the estimate is uncertain, it is consistent with 
the interpretation that parliamentary controls have less of a delaying effect in weakly 
democratized countries than robust democracies. 
 
 
Figure 4: Relative hazards of parliamentary controls on deployment time. Shaded areas 
represent 50/95% confidence intervals. 
A comparison of Sweden and Norway illustrates the impact of parliamentary constraints. The 
two are similar in most respects but differ in the extent of parliamentary controls over foreign 
military engagements. In Sweden, participation in Chapter VII operations, which constitute the 
majority of contemporary UN peacekeeping missions, requires parliamentary approval (Heldt, 
2012). In Norway, the right to deploy troops abroad is exercised by the government (Kjeksrud, 
2016). This could be one reason why Norway’s mean deployment time is four months, whereas 
Sweden’s is over a year.  
Several other factors systematically correlate with deployment speed. The coefficient on 
contingent size is positive and highly statistically significant regardless of specification, 
indicating that troop units that form part of a larger contingent have shorter deployment times. 
This suggests that the unwieldiness of larger contingents is outweighed by the benefits of scale.  
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While GDP per capita of the mission country does not affect deployment speed, the coefficient 
on Area is consistently negative and statistically significant, supporting our expectation that 
larger countries pose greater logistical difficulties. Several of the missions with the longest 
mean deployment times (Figure 2), such as MONUC or UN-African Union Hybrid Operation 
in Darfur (UNAMID), involve deployment to remote regions of large countries. We also find 
that peacekeepers deploy faster to countries that generate higher numbers of refugees, globally, 
but slower to countries more integrated into world trade. This suggests that the UN responds 
more quickly to crises that produce humanitarian externalities than to those disrupting trade.  
We do not find any evidence that distance or battle deaths are significant predictors of 
deployment speed in the general sample. We note that this sample includes the mission in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), which deployed to an interstate conflict that generated a 
significantly higher volume of battle deaths (50,000) than any other mission (the median is 
626). If UNMEE is excluded from the sample (Table A6), conflict intensity is negatively 
associated with deployment speed, suggesting that in a sample of more typical missions, a 
riskier mission environment is associated with longer deployment times.  
Visual inspection of Schoenfeld residuals does not suggest any obvious violations of the 
proportional hazards assumption, but statistical tests (Therneau & Grambsch, 2013) indicate 
that some TCC-level variables have time-varying impacts. Following Box-Steffensmeier & 
Jones (2004), we model such temporal relationships by interacting these variables with logged 
time (Model 4). To enable this analysis, we expand the data into equally spaced intervals and 
reformulate the dependent variable as a discrete variable observed on a monthly basis, yielding 
a nominally higher N. The main effects remain robust to the inclusion of such interaction, but 
the interaction coefficients suggest that some effects attenuate with time. The effect of dyadic 
refugees weakens over time and becomes indistinguishable from zero from around eight 
months. For parliamentary controls, we observe a similar attenuation pattern. The effect of 
military capabilities, as discussed above, is subject to analogous weakening whereas that of 
military expenditure per soldier is largely time-insensitive.  
Additional tests 
We deepen our analysis by considering how our results hold up to three types of additional 
tests (Table II).  
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Table II: Cox duration models of time to deployment 
 
(5) 
Interdependencies 
(6) 
Decade FEs 
(7) 
Post-2000  
interaction 
(8) 
Post-2000  
interaction 
Expenditure / soldier  -0.21* -0.18* -0.33** -0.18† 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
Dyadic refugees 0.47** 0.47* 0.48** 0.61* 
 (0.17) (0.20) (0.18) (0.30) 
Military capability 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Mission experience  -0.12 -0.13† -0.14† -0.11 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Parliamentary controls -0.20† -0.21* -0.24* -0.25* 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) 
Distance 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.06 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) 
Dyadic trade -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.25) 
Contingent size 0.27* 0.30** 0.35** 0.29** 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) 
Area -0.18† -0.20** -0.24** -0.25** 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
GDP/capita mission country -0.03 0.004 -0.03 -0.05 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
Battle deaths -0.08 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.18) (0.21) (0.17) (0.18) 
P5 colony 0.64 0.84** 0.67* 0.67* 
 (0.39) (0.32) (0.29) (0.29) 
Economic importance -0.60** -0.53** -0.43* -0.43** 
 (0.23) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) 
Humanitarian salience 0.21 0.14 0.17 0.16 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) 
Lead TCC 0.26    
 (0.20)    
Number of TCCs -0.004    
 (0.02)    
Preference centrality 126.7*    
 (62.3)    
Preference centrality2 -1,094.5*    
 (473.8)    
Overstretch -0.16    
 (0.32)    
2000s  -0.49*   
  (0.24)   
2010s  -0.99*   
  (0.47)   
Post-2000   -2.81** -0.48† 
   (1.00) (0.27) 
Expenditure / soldier  post-2000   0.24*  
   (0.10)  
Dyadic refugees  post-2000    -0.14 
    (0.34) 
Observations 1,821 1,968 1,968 1,968 
R2 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.29 
Log Likelihood -11,535 -12,614 -12,610 -12,627 
Estimates are logarithms of risk ratios. Increases in coefficients with positive coefficients are associated with faster deployment. 
Robust errors clustered on missions. Efron method for ties. All continuous variables logged. †p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01  
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First, we consider strategic interdependencies. Model 5 includes measures testing for the effect 
of being the lead TCC, free-riding, network dynamics, and overstretch. We find that Preference 
centrality is associated with higher speed, a finding that overlaps with Ward & Dorussen’s 
(2016) observation regarding troop contributions in general. The negative sign on Number of 
TCCs suggests that a higher number of contributors facilitates marginally slower deployments, 
but the estimate is not significant. We interpret this as an indication that free-riding may be a 
smaller problem during the deployment than during the preceding force generation. Likewise, 
the coefficient on Lead TCC is positive, consistent with the notion that these TCCs deploy 
more swiftly than comparable TCCs without this role, but we would need more data to ascertain 
whether the estimate reflects a systematic effect. Second, we analyze historical shifts. Over 
time, the UN has sought to strengthen its rapid deployment arrangements (Coleman, Lundgren, 
& Oksamytna, 2020). Since these policy changes have been gradual, it is impossible to identify 
clear discontinuities, so a better approach is to look at broader trends. We include decade 
dummies that gauge unobserved time-varying factors impacting all missions deploying within 
the same period. These dummies (Model 6) provide intriguing new information on how UN 
rapid deployment has evolved over time. We find that, despite all the efforts to improve rapid 
deployment, missions in the 2000s and 2010s deployed more slowly than missions in the 1990s. 
This finding is consistent with the notion that TCC-level incentives are a key force in rapid 
deployment, possibly overshadowing efforts to improve institutional arrangements.  
Third, to gauge whether TCC incentives vary over time, we interact them with a binary 
indicator, post-2000, coded as 1 for deployments after the year 2000. This is a broad cut of the 
data, dividing the 1990s, characterized initially by enthusiasm for peacekeeping and broad 
participation of all types of TCCs and then by a peacekeeping crisis including the withdrawal 
of most Western TCCs, from the more recent period, characterized a peacekeeping resurgence 
with troops overwhelmingly from the developing world. The interaction with military 
expenditure per soldier in Model 7 is positive, suggesting that economic incentives, to the 
extent they are accurately captured by this variable, had more of an impact in the 1990s than 
afterward. The exact reasons for this require further research, but a possible reason is that many 
of the largest TCCs experienced significant increases in prosperity in the last 30 years, 
attenuating the relative importance of reimbursements (cf. Coleman and Nyblade 2018).11 We 
 
11 For example, the GDP per capita of Bangladesh, one of the largest TCCs, grew by 278% between 1995 and 
2015. 
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do not find a statistically significant association for an identical interaction with dyadic 
refugees (Model 8).  
Taken as a whole, the results are broadly consistent with our hypotheses. The evidence 
strengthens our belief that greater incentives and fewer procedural hurdles at the TCC level 
facilitate more expeditious deployment. We note that some results, specifically those relating 
to parliamentary controls, are dependent on specifications and modeling approaches, and that 
others depend on the choice of indicator. Next to the TCC-level factors, we find that 
deployment speed is sensitive to a range of mission circumstances, including general logistical 
conditions and conflict externalities. We also find clear indications of temporal effects, both 
within missions and across different eras of peacekeeping. 
Beyond what is reported here, we took several steps to ensure that our results are not driven by 
particularities of model choice or specification. In the online appendix, we present results based 
on alternative clustering strategies, different methods for resolving ties in survival modeling 
(Breslow), and other aggregation choices (data on individual troops or TCC contingents).  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Based on new data on 28 UN peacekeeping missions established between 1991 and 2015, we 
carried out the first statistical analysis of TCC-level variation in deployment speed. Three key 
contributor-level findings emerge. First, TCCs where UN reimbursements are large relative to 
military expenditure per soldier deploy more rapidly than comparable countries. Second, 
countries exposed to refugee flows from the mission country deploy sooner than countries that 
do not experience such conflict-generated externalities. Third, parliamentary controls over 
foreign deployments reduce the speed of deployment, especially in full democracies. Contrary 
to expectations, while large armies may enjoy benefits of scale, TCC capabilities do not 
systematically predict deployment speed. Beyond the TCC-level explanations, mission 
conditions also matter. Deployment is slower to countries that are large and experience ongoing 
violence. Conversely, countries that are small, fairly stable, and generate externalities for the 
entire international community can expect an overall faster deployment.  
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Our study suggests several implications for the literature. First, it extends our understanding of 
rapid deployment in UN peacekeeping. To date, discussions on rapid deployment have 
concentrated on various institutional mechanisms to facilitate quicker start-up. While such 
mechanisms are important tools, their impact can only be understood in the context of TCC 
incentives, capabilities, and constraints. The UN is a global organization whose members differ 
economically, militarily, and politically, and this diversity shapes how they participate in 
existing institutional mechanisms.  
Second, our study adds nuance to the academic understanding of states’ motivations for 
participating in UN peacekeeping. Our findings demonstrate that some of the motivations 
discussed in the literature on troop contributions may impact the speed with which troops are 
delivered. We also show, however, that deployment speed is affected by factors that have little 
or nothing to do with motivations, such as constraints and mission conditions. Taken as a 
whole, this suggests that different stages of the deployment process – from the initial decision 
to contribute, over domestic pre-deployment preparations, to actual boots on the ground – are 
governed by mechanisms that are partly overlapping but also distinct.   
Third, as the first systematic investigation of deployment speed in UN peacekeeping, this 
article sets the scene for further research into its dynamics and determinants. Several questions 
remain unanswered, presenting opportunities for future research. To begin with, reflecting the 
debate about the relative importance of financial incentives for peacekeeping participation, 
future studies should deepen our understanding of economic incentives and explore a wider 
range of factors that might motivate TCCs to deploy quickly. In addition, our data suggest that 
interdependencies and sequencing have some influence on the speed of deployment, which 
warrant a more systematic examination. Finally, although policy reports and case studies are 
unanimous in stressing the importance of rapid deployment, the effects of deployment speed 
on specific peacekeeping outcomes deserve more attention.  
In terms of policy, we suggest that the UN should focus on those TCC characteristics that it 
can realistically influence. The UN can do little to change the extent of parliamentary control 
over international deployments, which is a matter of domestic jurisdiction. While the UN can 
engage with national parliaments to increase awareness of peacekeeping’s importance, its 
ability to help governments overcome this domestic constraint is limited. Likewise, it cannot 
do anything to affect most mission conditions. By contrast, the organization can enhance TCC 
incentives for rapid deployment, including financial ones. While further research would be 
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needed to fully understand how TCC governments and militaries perceive – and react to – 
financial incentives, our results indicate that they are a policy lever available to the UN which 
may have a real impact. We recognize the ethical debates surrounding the current division of 
labor in UN peacekeeping, where developed countries provide most of the funding but 
developing states bear the risk of personnel deployments. Yet as long as this system remains 
in place, the UN should pursue solutions to the problem of rapid deployment: when 
peacekeepers – from both developed and developing countries – deploy slowly, they are 
dangerously exposed during the start-up and may need to stay longer if they miss the initial 
window of opportunity to cement peace.  
 
Replication data 
The dataset and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article, along with the Online 
appendix, can be found at http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets. All analyses were conducted using 
R version 3.6.3. 
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